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Abstract: Bounded confidence models add a critical theoretical ingredient to the explanation of opinion clus-
tering, opinion polarisation, and the persistence of opinion diversity, assuming that individuals are only in-
fluenced by others who are suiciently similar and neglect actors with too dierent views. However, despite
its enormous recognition in the literature, the bounded confidence assumption has been criticized for being
able to explain diversity only when implemented in a very strict and unrealistic way. Themodel is unable to ex-
plain patterns of opiniondiversitywhenactors are sometimes influenced also byotherswhoholddistant views,
evenwhen these deviations from thebounded-confidence assumption are rare and random. Here, we echo this
criticism but we also show that the model’s ability to explain opinion diversity can be regained when another
assumption is relaxed. Building on modeling work from statistical mechanics, we include that actors’ opinion
changes do not only result from social influence. When other influences are modelled as random, uniformly
distributed draws, then robust patterns of opinion clustering emerge also with the relaxed implementations of
bounded confidence. The results holds under both communication regimes: the updating to the average of all
acceptable opinions as in the model of Hegselmann and Krause (2002) and random pair-wise communication
as in the model of Deuant et al. (2000). We discuss implications for future modelling work and point to gaps
in empirical research on influence.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, continuous opinions, noise, diversity puzzle, facilitation, probability of accep-
tance
Introduction
1.1 The bounded-confidence model(Hegselmann & Krause 2002; Deuant et al. 2000) is one of the success stories
of formal modeling work in the social sciences. It is build on very few, simple assumptions about individual
behavior but generates complex and surprising dynamics and clustering patterns. This is certainly the main
reason why it has attracted impressive scholarly attention in fields as diverse as sociology, physics, computer
science, philosophy, economics, communication science, and political science.
1.2 The bounded-confidencemodel proposes a prominent solution to one of themost persistent research puzzles
of the social sciences, Abelson’s diversity puzzle (Abelson 1964).1 Building on Harary (1959), Abelson studied
social-influence dynamics in networks where connected nodes exert influence on each others’ opinions in that
they grow more similar through repeated averaging. He analytically proved that social influence will always
generate perfect consensus unless the network consists of multiple unconnected subsets with zero influence
between them. This result was later extended to a theory of rational consensus in science and society (DeG-
root 1974; Lehrer & Wagner 1981). Stunned by his finding, Abelson formulated an intriguing research puzzle:
“Since universal ultimate agreement is an ubiquitous outcome of a very broad class of mathematical models,
we are naturally led to inquire what on earth one must assume in order to generate the bimodal outcome of
community cleavage studies.” Abelson’s puzzle is challenging, because consensus is a very robust pattern. For
instance, Abelson (1964) showed that consensus is inevitable evenwhen one also includes the assumption that
social influence between actors is weaker when they hold very discrepant opinions prior to the interaction, an
assumption that was supported by laboratory studies (Fisher & Lubin 1958; Aronson et al. 1963)2.
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Figure 1: Panel (a) shows a run of opinion dynamics with a fixed network of 100 agents as in (Abelson 1964).
Agents influence each other when their initial opinions dier by not more than 0.15. Nevertheless, this model
generates consensus. Panel (b) shows a run with the model of Hegselmann & Krause (2002) with a bounded-
confidence threshold of  = 0.15. The influence network is not fixed. This model generates multiple clusters
of opinions. Panel (c) also assumes  = 0.15 but adds the assumption that influence weights turn 1 with a
probability of 0.001. This model generates opinion clusters but clusters ultimately converge as a result of the
random deviations from the bounded-confidence assumption.
1.3 Panel (a)of Figure 1 illustrates the inevitable trend towardsperfectuniformity that social influencegenerates ina
fixednetworkwith 100agents. For this ideal-typical simulation run,weassumed that agents’ initial opinions are
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from zero to one. Agents with an initial opinion distance
of less 0.15 were connected by a fixed network link. In each time step, agents update their opinions, adopting
the arithmetic mean of their own opinion and the opinions of their network contacts. The figure shows that
opinions converge to consensus despite the high initial opinion diversity and the relatively sparse influence
network. Clustering of opinions can only be observed transiently.
1.4 The solution to Abelson’s puzzle proposed by the bounded-confidence model is strikingly simple, because it
sharpens just one of Abelson’s ownmodelling assumptions: The influence of the opinions of others on the indi-
vidual is not only declining with opinion discrepancy3 but individuals ignore influence by actors when opinion
discrepancy exceeds a threshold – the bound of confidence. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows opinion dynamics of
the bounded confidencemodel of Hegselmann &Krause (2002) with initial conditions identical to the one from
Panel (a). The crucial dierence between the two simulation runs is that the influence network in Panel (b) is
not fixed. New ties are createdwhen two agents’ opinion distance has decreased to a value below the bounded-
confidence threshold of  = 0.15, and ties are dissolved whenever opinion dierences exceed 0.15. Panel (b)
illustrates that the bounded-confidencemodels predicts the emergence of increasingly homogeneous clusters,
which at some point in time adopt opinions that dier too much from each other. As a consequence, opinions
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cannot converge further and clusters remain stable.
1.5 Other approaches to Abelson’s puzzle included assumptions about negative social-influence (Macy et al. 2003;
Mark 2003; Salzarulo 2006; Flache & Mäs 2008), the communication of persuasive arguments (Mäs et al. 2013;
Mäs & Flache 2013), biased assimilation (Dandekar et al. 2013), information accumulation (Shin & Lorenz 2010),
striving for uniqueness (Mäs et al. 2010), attraction by initial views (Friedkin 2015), influences by external forces
such as media and opinion leaders (Watts & Dodds. 2007) and the assumption that opinions are measured on
nominal scales (Axelrod 1997; Liggett 2013). However, noneof theseapproacheshasattractedasmuchscholarly
attention as the bounded confidence model.
1.6 Thebounded-confidence assumptionhas alsobeen subject to important criticism (Mäs et al. 2013;Mäs&Flache
2013). To be sure, the assumption that individuals tend to be influenced by similar others is certainly very plau-
sible in many social settings and has been supported by sociological research on homophily (McPherson et al.
2001; Lazarsfeld & Merton 1954) and social-psychological studies in the Similarity-Attraction-Paradigm (Byrne
1971). However, bounded-confidence models assume that individuals always ignore opinions that dier from
their own views, which is an extreme and unrealistic interpretation. In other words, it is certainly plausible that
individuals’ confidence inothers is boundedbut it is certainlynotplausible that individuals arenever influenced
by actors with very dierent opinions.4
1.7 In fact, even a tiny relaxation of the bounded-confidence assumption fundamentally changes model predic-
tions, as Panel (c) of Figure 1 illustrates. These dynamics were generatedwith amodel identical to themodel of
Panel (b) but with a slightly relaxed bounded-confidence assumption. We included that with a tiny probability
of 0.001 also agents with otherwise too big opinion dierences (dierence exceeds 0.15) take each others’ opin-
ions into account when they update their views. Panel (c) shows that this seemingly innocent relaxation of the
bounded-confidence assumption results in the emergence of opinion consensus and, thus, suggests that the
bounded-confidence assumption might not be a satisfactory solution to Abelson’s puzzle.
1.8 Even though we emphasize this criticism of bounded-confidence models, we show here that the model’s abil-
ity to solve Abelson’s puzzle can be regained if another model assumption is relaxed. In particular, we relax
the common assumption of social-influencemodels that actors’ opinions are only aected by social influence.
Inspired by modelling work published in the field of statistical mechanics (Pineda et al. 2009, 2013; Carro et al.
2013), we include the assumption that an agent’s opinion might sometimes happen to switch to another, new
opinion not as a result of social influence but at random. These random opinion changes might reflect, for in-
stance, influences on agents’ opinions from external sources, or turnover dynamics in an organization where
employees leave the organization and are replaced by newworkerswho hold opinions that are unrelated to the
opinion of the leaving person. We study the conditions under which this mechanism leads to the emergence
and persistence of opinion diversity and opinion clustering even when the bounded-confidence assumption is
implemented in aweaker fashion as in its original strict way but accompanied by randomopinion replacement.
Themodel
2.1 We adopt an agent-based modeling framework and assume that each agent i of N agents is described by a
continuous opinion xi(t) ranging from 0 to 1. At every time step t agents’ opinions are updated in two ways.
First, agents are socially influenced by the opinions of others, as assumed by classical social-influence models
and the bounded-confidencemodels. Second, we included that agents’ opinionsmay also change due to other
forces. To this end,weadded thatagents canadopta randomopinionas studied inmodels inspiredbystatistical
mechanics (Pineda et al. 2009, 2013; Carro et al. 2013).
2.2 Social influence is implemented as follows. First, the computer program identifies those agents who will exert
influence on i’s opinion. To this end, the program first calculates what Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) called the prob-
ability of acceptance, i.e. the probability that an agent j is influential, using Equation 1. Next, agent i updates
her opinion, adapting to the average of the opinions of the influential agents and i’s own opinion.
2.3 Following psychological literature on opinion and attitude change (Abelson 1964; Fishbein & Ajzen 1975; Hunter
et al. 1984, e.g.), we define opinion discrepancy between agents i and j as the distance in opinion D(i, j) =
|xi(t) − xj(t)| and assume that the probability that i is influenced by j declines with opinion discrepancy. To
that end, we define the probability of acceptance for i and j as







} ifD(i, j) ≤ ε,
β otherwise,
(1)
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where ε ∈ [0, 1] is the bound of confidence, f reflects the facilitation, and β the default influence probability.
We adopt the concept of “facilitation” from Fishbein & Ajzen (1975)’s seminal attitude theory. Facilitation deter-
mines the strength of the decay of the probability of acceptancewith increasing discrepancy. Lower facilitation
f gives an initially steeper downward slope. When facilitation ismaximal (1/f = 0, or f =∞), however,P (i, j)
is constant at one for discrepancies smaller than or equal to ε. The default influence probability β is the mini-
mal probability of acceptance. Thus, for β > 0 there is always a certain chance that i is influenced by j. For the
simulation run shown in Panel (c) of Figure 1, for instance, we assumed that β = 0.001. Thus, we have extended
the bounded-confidence assumption to a functional form of a probability of acceptance with three parameters
ε, f and β. For β = 0 and maximal facilitation Equation 1 turns into a step function identical to the model of
(Hegselmann & Krause 2002).5







where n is the number of agents j′ who are accepted by i through decisions based on the probability of accep-
tance. This implements the notion that an agent checks all other agents for inclusion in its confidence set as
assumed by Hegselmann & Krause (2002). Therefore, we call this model the generalized Hegselmann-Krause
model.
2.5 For ε = 1 and β = 0, the definition of P is identical to the definition in the seminal model in social psychology
of Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) fromwhich also the concept “probability of acceptance” is adopted.
2.6 The secondmodel ingredient are randomopinion replacements. We implemented that agents adopt a randomly
picked opinion with probabilitym. The new opinion is a random value in the range of [0, 1] and is drawn from
a uniform distribution (Pineda et al. 2009, 2013; Carro et al. 2013). The rate of random opinion influx is given by
m ·N perN time steps. This means thatm ·N independent opinion renewals would occur on average during
N interdependent opinion renewals, hencem gives the ratio, or relative importance, of independent opinion
replacement.
2.7 In a nutshell, the simulation programproceeds as follows. In the iteration from time step t to t+1, the program
decides for each individual agent i whether each of the other agents exerts influence on i by random events
with respect to the probability of acceptance. Next, the program computes the updated opinion of agent i at
time step t+ 1 as the average of all those agents that have been selected to exert influence. Next, the program
decides through a random event with respect to the probability of random opinion replacements whether this
updated opinion is replaced by a completely new, randomly drawn opinion. The order in which agents are
updated does not matter in this process, because we always use the opinions from time step t to compute the
opinion for time step t+ 1 (synchronous updating).
2.8 In the following we assumed one thousand randomly distributed agents along the entire opinion axis for the
initial state (N = 1000). Eects of dierent initial conditions (i.e., hysteresis problems) are not discussed here.
Results
3.1 Figure 2 shows three ideal-typical opiniondynamics to illustrate the eects of randomopinion changesonopin-
ion dynamics. In the figures, the agent distribution is shown as the probability density, which is estimated by
the kernel density estimation with the bandwidth of 0.005. For all three simulation runs, we assigned positive
values to parameters β and f , implementing that there is always a small but positive probability that an agent
j exerts influence on i’s opinion. When agents’ opinions only depend on social influence and there are no ran-
dom opinion changes (m = 0), then this parameter setting implies that dynamics will always generate opinion
consensus. Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows that social influence leads to the formationof clusters. However, as there
is always a positive chance that members of distinct clusters exert influence on each other, clusters merge and
the population reaches a perfect opinion consensus.
3.2 Panel (b) of Figure 2, in contrast, shows that including random opinion replacements (m = 0.1) leads to a very
dierent outcome. Like in the dynamics shown in panel (a), social influence leads to the formation of clusters of
agents with similar opinions. However, these clusters remain stable. This result is obtained even though there
is always a positive probability of acceptance and even though the opinion replacements are entirely random.
3.3 The intuition is simple. Social influence leads to the formation of clusters, but due to the random opinion re-
placements, clusters also loose members from time to time. These agents will first adopt a random opinion
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but will sooner or later join one of the clusters. Thus, all clusters have an input and an output of agents and
remain stable when in and output are balanced. To be sure, it is possible that a cluster happens to disappear in
this dynamic. However, randomness in tandemwith social influence will lead to the formation of a new cluster
(Pineda et al. 2009, 2013; Carro et al. 2013) and the collective pattern of opinion clustering will reemerge.
3.4 Panel (c) of Figure 2 shows that clusters disappear, however, when random opinion replacements happen too
frequently. For this run, we imposed that opinions adopt random values with a probability of 0.5. Under this
condition, social influence is too weak to generate stable clustering.
3.5 Figures 3 and 4 extend the observations from the three ideal-typical runs to broader parameter spaces, using
opinion pattern diagrams6 to visualize aggregated agent-distributions for quasi-steady states (except for the
panel (a) of Figure 4, as we discuss below) in twenty independent simulation runs per parameter combination.
The number of simulation events (Tmax) required for the quasi-steady states greatly depends on parameter
settings, hence we adjusted Tmax for each panel empirically to save computation time.
3.6 Figure 3 focuses on the original implementation of confidence bounds, where the probability of acceptance
is either zero or one (see panel (a)). Panel (b), thus, replicates the findings from earlier studies with the orig-
inal bounded-confidence model (Lorenz 2007), showing that the bounded-confidence model can explain the
emergence and stability of opinion clusteringwhen agents’ confidence is suiciently bounded. When ε exceeds
a value of 0.23, agents arrive at consensus, forming one big cluster close to the center of the opinion space.
However, agents form multiple clusters, when they have narrower bounds of confidence (ε < 0, 23). These
clusters are stable because the probability that an agent is influenced by an agent from another cluster is zero.
The number of clusters forming is roughly 1/(2ε) (e.g., Deuant et al. 2000; Ben-Naim et al. 2003). Note that
panel (b) fails to visualize the emergent clustering for very small values of ε, as the model generates a large
number of opinion clusters with only small (but stable) opinion dierences between clusters. When ε = 0.05,
for instance, dynamics typically settle when about eight distinct clusters have formed. Random dierences in
the initial opinion distributions of the twenty realizations per parameter combination, however, lead to small
dierences in the exact positions of the clusters between simulation runs. As a consequence, the dierences
between clusters are not visible in the aggregated opinion distributions shown in panel (b) of Figure 3.
3.7 The predictions of the standard bounded-confidence model are robust to including random opinion replace-
ments (m = 0.1), as panel (c) of Figure 3 shows. When agents sometimes happen to adopt a random opinion
(drawn from a uniform distribution), clustering can be stable when the bounds of confidence are suiciently
small.
3.8 However, the ability of the bounded-confidence model to generate stable clustering breaks down when one
slightly relaxes the bounded-confidence assumption in that one allows also agents with otherwise to divergent
opinions to exert influence on each other with a small probability of β = 0.001. Demonstrating this, panel (d)
of Figure 3 shows that the initial opinion diversity decreases and the agent populations arrive at a consensus,
even when agents have very narrow bounds of confidence.
3.9 Strikingly, the ability of the bounded-confidence model to explain clustering is regained when both forms of
randomness are included (see panel (e) of Figure 3). That is, when agents sometimes adopt random opinion
values (β = 0.001) and when random violations of the bounded-confidence assumption are included (m =
0.1), opinion clustering remains stable when agents’ confidence in others is suiciently bounded.
3.10 Figure 4 shows the same analyses as Figure 3 but focuses on the less restrictive interpretation of the bounded-
confidence assumption, where the probability of acceptance is not modelled as a step function. To generate
these figures, we assumed that ε = 1 and varied parameter f (see panel (a)). Accordingly, the x-axis represents
parameter f rather then ε.
3.11 Panel (b) of Figure 4 focuses on the condition without random opinion changes (m = 0) and without ran-
dom deviations from the bounded-confidence rule (β = 0). It is important to understand that the opinion
variance shown in the le part of panel (b) is an artifact of our decision to run simulations for “only” 5000 sim-
ulation events and of floating point precision close to zero. Even under small facilitation values the probability
of acceptance is always positive, which implies that populations will always reach a consensus, because every
possible interaction will continue to occur ad infinitum although quite rarely. However, small f values lead to
probabilities of acceptance that are so small that agentswithdistant opinions hardly influence eachother or are
even represented by zero due to floating point imprecision. As a consequence, consensus is not reachedwith in
the limit of 5000 simulation events and will perhaps not even do without technical modifications dealing with
floating point precision.
3.12 In order to test whether our intuition that the model generates consensus also for small facilitation values, we
ran twenty additional simulations with f = 0.05 and without a predefined simulation end (m = 0, β = 0).
JASSS, 19(4) 7, 2016 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/19/4/7.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3220
Figure 2: Time evolution of normalized agents density for three dierent magnitudes of random opinion re-
placement.
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Supporting our intuition, we observed that all twenty populations generated a consensus. On average, it took
systems approximately 30,000 iterations to decrease the value range of opinions to less then 10−10.
3.13 Panel (d) of Figure 4 is basedon the sameparameter conditions as panel (b) but adds a small default acceptance
probability of β = 0.001, which excludes the artifact observed in panel (b). Accordingly, panel (d) shows that
all simulation runs generated consensus, independent of the degree f of facilitation. This shows again that the
bounded-confidence model fails to generate opinion clustering when the bounded-confidence assumption is
implemented in a less restrictive way than in the original contributions.
3.14 However, system behaviour diers very much when random opinion replacements are included (m = 0.1),
as panels (c) and (e) of Figure 4 show. In particular, panel (e) shows that the model generates phases of opin-
ion clustering even though there is always a positive probability of acceptance and even though independent
opinion changes are added.
3.15 In order to demonstrate that the opinion clustering observed in the simulation runs with random opinion re-
placements (panels (c) and (e) of Figure 4) is not an artifact of a limited duration of the simulations and/or
floating point issues, we reran the simulation experiment for these experimental treatments assuming that all
agents held the same opinion at the outset of the dynamics (xi(0) = 0.5 for all i). In Appendix B we show that
the resulting opinion pattern diagrams are virtually identical to those generated in the main simulation exper-
iment where simulations departed from a uniform opinion distribution. This shows that the opinion diversity
shown in panels (c) and (e) of Figure 4 also emergeswhen dynamics start fromperfect consensus, showing that
these results are not artifacts.
3.16 So far, we focused on the bounded-confidence model developed by Hegselmann & Krause (2002) which as-
sumes that agents consider the opinions of multiple sources when they update their opinions. The alternative
bounded-confidencemodel by Deuant et al. (2000), in contrast, assumed that influence is dyadic in the sense
that agents always consider only the opinion of one other agent for opinion update. We focused our analy-
ses on the Hegselmann-Krause model mainly because it is more similar to the original work of Abelson (1964).
We demonstrated in Appendix A, however, that our conclusions also hold under the dyadic influence regime
proposed by Deuant et al. (2000).
3.17 We provide a NetLogo implementation of our model which allows readers to produce trajectories of all model
variations presented here (Lorenz et al. 2016) . The reader can use it to observe and explore our claims on
the basis of independent simulation runs. The model also includes “example buttons”, which set the model
parameters to the values studied in our examples.
Summary and conclusions
4.1 Bounded-confidence models proposed the most prominent solution to Abelson’s puzzle of explaining opinion
clustering in connected networks where nodes exert positive influence on each other. However, the models
have been criticized for being able to generate opinion clustering only when the assumption that agents’ confi-
dence in others is bound is being interpreted in amaximally strict sense. When one allows agents to sometimes
deviate from thebounded-confidence assumption, clusteringbreaksdownevenwhen thesedeviations are rare
and random.
4.2 Even though we echoed the criticism that the predictions of the original bounded-confidence models are not
robust to random deviations, we showed the models’ ability to explain clustering can be regained if another
typical assumption of social-influence models is relaxed. Building on modeling advances from the field of sta-
tistical mechanics (Pineda et al. 2009, 2013; Carro et al. 2013), we showed that a bounded-confidence model
that takes into account random deviations from the bounded-confidence assumption is able to explain opin-
ion clustering when one includes that agents’ opinion are not only aected by influence from other agents. If,
in addition, opinions can change in a random fashion, clustering can emerge and remain stable. Thus, our re-
sults demonstrate that the bounded-confidencemodel does provide an important answer to Abelson’s puzzle,
despite the criticism.
4.3 Our findings illustrate that in complex systemsseemingly innocent events canhaveprofoundeects, evenwhen
these events are rare and random. One importantway todealwith theproblem is tobasemodels onempirically
validated assumptions. With regard to the bounded-confidencemodel, however, too little is known about how
bounded individuals’ confidence actually is. How is this boundedness distributed in our societies and under
what conditions can bounds shi and increase or decrease openness to distant opinions? Under which con-
ditions do individuals deviate from the bounded-confidence assumption? Are these deviations random or do
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Figure 3: Opinion pattern diagrams for the original Hegselmann-Krause model with bounded confidence. The
studied parameter range is 0 ≤ ε ≤ 0.5 and the resolution is 0.01.
they follow certain patterns? Our finding that deviations have a decisive eect on the predictions of bounded-
confidence models shows that empirical answers to these questions are urgently needed.
4.4 What ismore, empirical research is needed to informmodels about how to formally incorporatedeviations from
model assumptions. For instance, we adopted from earliermodelingwork (Pineda et al. 2009, 2013; Carro et al.
2013) the assumption that agents sometimes adopt a random opinion and that this random opinion is drawn
from a uniform distribution. This is certainly a plausible model of turnover dynamics, where individuals may
happen to leave a social group or organization, making space for a replacement with an independent opinion.
However, this model of deviations appears to be a less plausible representation of other influences, such as
social influences from outside themodelled population or the empirically well documented striving for unique
opinions (Mäsetal. 2010). For instance, deviationshavealsobeenmodelledas “whitenoise”. That is, rather than
assigning a new, random value to the agent’s opinion, a random value drawn from a normal distribution with
an average of zerowas added to agents’ opinions (Mäs et al. 2010). This “white noise” leads on average tomuch
smaller randomopinion changes, which generates very dierent opinion dynamics, as it does notmake agents
leave and enter clusters as observedwith the uniformly distributed noise. In contrast, white-noise deviations at
the level of individual agents aggregate to randomopinion shisof clusters. As a consequence, it is possible that
clusters happen to adopt similar opinions and merge, a process that will inevitably generate global consensus
andnot clustering as observedwith uniformly distributednoise (Mäs et al. 2010). In sum, deviations frommodel
assumptions can be incorporated in dierent ways and model predictions oen depend on the exact formal
implementation. Theoretical and empirical research is, therefore, needed to identify conditions under which
alternativemodels of deviations aremore or less plausible. Empirical research in the field of evolutionary game
theory has shown, for instance, that deviations tend to occur more likely when they imply small costs (Mäs &
Nax 2016). Similar research should be conducted also in the field of social-influence dynamics.
4.5 The bounded confidencemodel is yet another example of a theory that makes fundamentally dierent predic-
tions when its assumptions are implemented probabilistically rather than deterministically (Macy & Tsvetkova
2013). It is, therefore, important that theoretical predictions, independent of whether they have been derived
formallyornot, are tested for robustness to randomness. Tobesure, there isnodoubt thatdeterministicmodels
are insightful, as they allow the researcher to analyze theories in a clean environment without any perturba-
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Figure 4: Opinion pattern diagrams for the generalized Hegselmann-Krause model with a smooth acceptance
function. The studied parameter range is f ≥ 0.01 and the resolution is 0.03 in terms of log10 1f , which gives
finer resolution for smaller f so thatwe are able to keep better resolution in regionswith smaller structures and
are able to save the computation cost simultaneously. For example, it corresponds to∼ 0.0014 in terms of f at
0.02, while∼ 0.0067 at f = 0.1.
tions. This oen simplifies analyses, making it easier to understand the model’s mechanisms and their con-
sequences. Nevertheless, a model prediction that only holds for deterministic settings is of limited scientific
value, because it cannot be to put to the empirical test in a non-deterministic world. The notion that individual
behaviour is deterministic may be useful but it is not an innocent assumption.
4.6 In sum, we studied a new answer to Abelson’s question of how to generate the empirical finding of bimodal
opinion distributions. Abelson’s approach to assume that influence declines with opinion discrepancy is sup-
ported by empirical research but turned out to not solve his puzzle. The original bounded-confidence models
were able to explain opinion clustering by assuming that the influence network is not fixed, and by further
strengthening Abelson’s assumption, implementing a threshold in discrepancy beyond which influence van-
ishes completely. We showed here that Abelson’s weaker implementation of influence declining in discrepancy
does generate opinion clustering when it is combined with random independent opinion replacements.
Appendix A: Model based on Deuant et al
The conclusions drawn from our analyses do not only apply to the bounded-confidence model proposed by
Hegselmann & Krause (2002) but also hold for the model by Deuant et al. (2000), as Figures 5 and 6 show. In
this alternative model, the agent-interaction scheme is divided into two subprocesses. First, two agents i and
j are randomly picked. Second i and j influence each other and adjust their opinions with a given probability
of acceptance P if their opinions do not dier too much.
When agents i and j are selected for interaction and accept each other, they adjust their opinions towards each





with a probability P (i, j)
xi(t) otherwise.
(3)
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Figure 5: Opinion pattern diagrams for the original Deuant et al. model with bounded confidence.
Figure6: Opinionpatterndiagrams for thegeneralizedDeuantet al. modelwitha smoothacceptance function.
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Appendix B: Opinion patterns
The experiments described in the main text cannot exclude the possibility that the opinion patterns shown in
panels (c) and (e) of Figures 3 and 4 also result from the fact that we did not run simulations long enough. To
ensure that the diagrams in those panels are not suering from insuicient simulation length, we conducted
additional simulations that started with a perfect consensus (i.e., all agents have an opinion of 0.5 at the initial
state). The additional simulations resulted in very similar general opinion patterns (Figure 7), which shows that
our discussion in this study is valid. This holds for both version of the bounded-confidence model.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 should be compared to panel (c) of Figure 4 and panel (c) of Figure 7 should be compared
to panel (e) of Figure 4. Likewise, panel (b) of Figure 7 should be compared to panel (c) of Figure 3 and panel (d)
of Figure 7 should be compared to panel (e) of Figure 3.
Figure 7: Opinion patterns emerging when dynamics start from perfect consensus at an opinion value of 0.5.
Notes
1Abelson’s diversity puzzle is called “community cleavage problem” by Friedkin (2015).
2This observation was later generalized by Davis (1996).
3Formally opinion discrepancy is nothing else than distance in opinion and this notion is usually used in the
social simulation literature. We use "discrepancy" here because it is the original notion used by Abelson and
well established in psychological models (see e.g. Hunter et al. 1984). In this paper discrepancy is the same as
distance, which is also the case for a large part of the psychological literature.
4Another criticism was that there are no “hard” bounds but “smooth” ones. Therefore, already some early
variations of bounded confidencemodels on the evolution of extremism (Deuant et al. 2002, 2004) introduced
dierent kinds of smoother bounds. Both studies did not analyse the impact of smoothness itself.
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5Mäs&Bischofberger (2015) use the same function for thedefinitionof similarity and interactionprobability.
They use a parameter h = 1/f quantifying the degree of homophily in the society. In our parametrization they
further used β = 0 and ε = 2 for an opinion space where opinion can take values between -1 and 1.
6Based on Ben-Naim et al. (2003) these diagrams are called “bifurcation diagrams” in the physics literature
e.g. by (Lorenz 2007; Pineda et al. 2009, 2013; Carro et al. 2013).
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